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Abstract
In a hub-and-spoke network, the total proﬁt function of an airline is supermodular
with respect to its entry decisions at diﬀerent city-pairs. This source of complementar-
ity implies that a hub-and-spoke network can be an eﬀective strategy to deter entry of
competitors. This paper presents a dynamic game of airlines network competition that
incorporates this entry deterrence motive for using hub-and-spoke networks. We sum-
marize the results of the estimation of the model, with particular attention to empirical
evidence on the entry deterrence motive.
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An airline’s network is a description of the city-pairs that the airline connects with non-stop
ﬂights. Two network structures that have received particular attention in studies of the
airline industry are hub-and-spoke networks and point-to-point networks. In a hub-and-spoke
network an airline concentrates most of its operations in one airport, called the hub. All
other cities in the network (i.e., the spokes) are connected to the hub by non-stop ﬂights
such that travellers between two spoke-cities should take a connecting ﬂight at the hub. In
contrast, in a point-to-point network all cities are connected with each other through non-
stop ﬂights. Pure hub-and-spoke or pure point-to-point networks are very rear. Most airlines
have some degree of ’hubbing’. Table 1 presents measures of “hubbing” based on airlines’
networks in the 55 largest US cities. These measures try to capture the degree in which an
airline’s operation is concentrated in one or a few airports.1
The choice of network structure is one of the most important strategic decisions of an
airline. The relationship between network structure and airlines’ operating costs has received
signiﬁcant attention by IO economists, both in theoretical and in empirical work. Diﬀerent
studies have shown how a hub-and-spoke network can exploit signiﬁcant economies of scope
at the airport level and economies of traﬃcd e n s i t y . 2
Other aspect of airline network competition that has received theoretical attention is the
airlines’ use of hub-and-spoke network as a strategy to deter the entry of competitors. This
argument was ﬁrst established by Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997) using a three-stage
1Table 1 presents two statistics, CR1 and CR2.L e t n be the total number of non-stop connections of
an airline. Let n(1) be the number of non-stop connections of the airline at the airport where it has more
connections. Similarly, let n(k) be the number of non-stop connections of the airline in its k-th largest airport,
excluding connections with any of its k-1 largest airports, if those connections exist. Then, for any inter K




i )/ni. For a pure hub-and-spoke network,
CR1=1 . For a network with two hubs, we have that CR1 > 1/2 and CR2=1 . For a pure point-to-point
network, CR1=2 /n.
2A hub-and-spoke network can fully connect C cities using the minimum number of direct connections,
C − 1. Therefore, it minimizes ﬁxed costs associated with establishing non-stop connections. Furthermore,
the diﬀerent routes that an airline has in the same airport may share some common operating costs. An
airline can beneﬁt from these economies of scope by concentrating their operation in a few airports. Last,
but not least, larger planes are more eﬃcient on a per-seat basis and airlines can exploit these cost savings by
seating in a single plane passengers who have diﬀerent ﬁnal destinations or who come from diﬀerent origins
(i.e., economies of traﬃc density). See Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1984), Berry (1990), Brueckner
and Spiller (1991), and Brueckner (2004), among others.
1sequential game of entry between an incumbent hub-and-spoke carrier and a point-to-point
regional carrier.3 The proﬁt function of a hub-and-spoke airline is supermodular with respect
to its entry decisions at diﬀerent city-pairs. This complementarity implies that a hub-and-
spoke airline may be willing to operate non-stop ﬂi g h t si nac i t y - p a i re v e nw h e np r o ﬁts
are negative because operation in that city-pair can generate positive proﬁts in other routes.
This is known by potential entrants, and therefore entry may be deterred. This argument for
entry deterrence does not suﬀer from several limitations of other more standard arguments
of predatory conduct. In particular, it does not require of a sacriﬁce of the incumbent (i.e.,
reduction in current proﬁts) that will be compensated in the future only if competitors do
not enter in the market.4 Also, it is not subject to Judd’s criticism to arguments of spatial
entry deterrence (Judd, 1985).5
Despite these attractive features of Hendricks-Piccione-Tan entry deterrence argument,
there are not previous studies that explore empirically this entry deterrence motive in airline
use of hub-and-spoke networks. Part of the reason for this lack of empirical evidence is the
absence of structural models of dynamic network competition that incorporate this hypothe-
sis and that are ﬂexible and realistic enough to be estimated with actual data. The objective
of this paper is to present a dynamic game of airlines network competition that incorporates
the strategic entry deterrence motive of a hub-and-spoke network and that can be estimated
using publicly available data from the US Bureau of Transportation. Also, we describe how
the estimated model can be used to test for strategic entry deterrence. In a companion
3See also Oum, Zhang, and Zhang (1995) and Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1999).
4It is diﬃcult to generate this type of predatory conduct as a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Furthermore, in antitrust cases, it is typically quite diﬃcult to ﬁnd convincing empirical evidence on the
sacriﬁce component of the argument. See the papers by Kim (2009) and Snider (2009) that deal with this
issue in US vs. American Airlines case.
5Judd (1985) notes that some models of entry and spatial location that generate entry deterrence as a
subgame perfect equilibrium place strong assumptions on ﬁrms’ level of commitment. Those papers assume
that entry and location decisions are completely irreversible, with no possibility of exit or relocation. Judd
shows that when there is strong enough substitutability among the stores of the same ﬁrm, allowing for exit
may result in non-successful spatial preemption by the incumbent. Potential entrants know the incumbent
ﬁrm may prefer to have a monopoly in a single location rather than being a monopolist in a location and a
duopolist in another nearby location. Therefore, spatial preemption and entry deterrence by the incumbent
is not a credible strategy. This type of argument does not apply to a hub-and-spoke airline because proﬁts
at diﬀerent city-pairs (diﬀerent "stores") are not substitute but complements. This complementarity makes
entry-deterrence a credible strategy in equilibrium.
2paper (Aguirregabiria and Ho, 2009), we estimate this model and use it to measure the
contribution of demand, cost, and strategic factors to explain hub-and-spoke networks. We
summarize here the main empirical results of that paper, with particular attention to the
empirical evidence on the entry deterrence motive.
2M o d e l
The industry is conﬁgured by N airline companies and C cities. A market is a city-pair.
Entry/exit in a city-pair is not directional, i.e., if an airline operates ﬂights from city A to
city B, then it should operate ﬂights from B to A. Therefore, there are M ≡ C(C − 1)/2
markets or city-pairs.W e i n d e x t i m e b y t,m a r k e t sb ym, and airlines by i.T h e network
of an airline consists of the set of city-pairs in which the airline operates non-stop ﬂights.
It can be represented by a vector xit ≡ {ximt : m =1 ,2,...,M},w h e r eximt ∈ {0,1} is the
binary indicator of the event "airline i operates non-stop ﬂights in city-pair m at period t".
The whole industry network is represented by the vector xt ≡ {xit : i =1 ,2,...,N} ∈ X,
where X ≡ {0,1}NM. Travellers are concerned about routes.Aroute is a directional round-
trip between two cities. A network describes implicitly all the routes for which an airline
provides ﬂights, either stop or non-stop. In principle, we can construct routes with many
(even inﬁnite) stops. We consider only routes with zero, one, or two stops.6 L(xit) is the set
of these routes associated with network xit. We index routes by r.
Every period (quarter)7 t, airlines take as given the current industry network xt and
choose prices for all the routes where they operate ﬂights, either non-stop or stop. Price
competition (static)8 determines variable proﬁts for each airline and route. Airlines also
decide their networks for next quarter, xit+1.T h e r e i s time-to-build such that ﬁxed costs
and entry costs are paid at quarter t but entry-exit decisions are not eﬀective until quarter
6Routes with more than two stops represent less than 1% of all the air tickets in the US Origin and
Destination (DB1B) database.
7The DB1B database has quarterly frequency.
8Intertemporal price discrimination and plane capacity constraints can generate dynamic (forward-
looking) pricing strategies at the level of individual ﬂights (i.e., speciﬁc ﬂight number and day). However,
that type of pricing dynamics is short-run and ﬂight-speciﬁc and it plays a very minor role in the dynamics
of network structure. For simplicity, this model ignores dynamic pricing.







ximt+1(FC imt +( 1− ximt)SCimt) (1)
Rir(xt)i st h ev a r i a b l ep r o ﬁt of airline i in the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium for route r. FC imt
represents the ﬁxed cost for airline i in market m and quarter t.A n dSCimt is a start-up cost
or entry cost at the city-pair level, i.e., an additional ﬁxed cost that should be paid if airline
i was not active in market m at period t and it decides to start operating at period t+1.T h e
equilibrium of the dynamic game implies a Markov transition probability for the industry
network, Pr(xt+1|xt), and its corresponding ergodic probability distribution, p∗(xt).9
Consumer demand and price competition. This part of the framework is a standard logit
model of demand and price competition. For notational simplicity, we omit the time subindex
t in the description of this static demand model. Let Hr be the number of potential travelers
in route r.F o rag i v e nr o u t e( r), there are two forms of product diﬀerentiation: the airline
(i), and the indicator of non-stop ﬂight (NS). Travelers decide which product (i,NS) to
purchase, if any. The indirect utility of a consumer in route r who purchases product
(i,NS) is bi,r,NS − pi,r,NS + vi,r,NS,w h e r epi,r,NS is the price, bi,r,NS is the quality of the
product, and vi,r,NS is a consumer-speciﬁc component that captures consumer heterogeneity
in preferences. Travellers can choose an outside alternative of not travelling by air. Quality
and price of the outside alternative are normalized to zero. In this paper, we ignore hub-
size eﬀects on demand and variable costs and consider a simple speciﬁcation for product
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is the quality of a nonstop-ﬂight of airline i.W ea s s u m et h a tvi,r,NS are independent Type
I extreme value random variables. Therefore, the aggregate demand of product (i,NS)
in route r is qi,r,NS =e x p {bi,r,NS − pi,r,NS}/[1 +
P
k exp{bk − pk}], where the sum
P
k is
over all the products available for route r. The variable proﬁt of airline i in route r is
9In a more general version of the model that includes exogenous state variables aﬀecting demand and costs,
that we represent with the vector zt, the dynamics of the industry can be described using the endogenous
Markov transition probability Pr(xt+1|xt,zt) and the exogenous transition probability of zt.
10Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009) consider a richer speciﬁcation of demand and variable costs that includes
a nested logit structure for travellers’ idiosyncratic preferences, permanent airline and city heterogeneity,
and hub-size eﬀects in both demand and variable costs.
4Rir =( pir0−cir0)qir0+(pir1−cir1)qir1,w h e r eci,r,NS is the constant marginal cost of product











i represent the marginal costs of stop-ﬂights
and non-stop ﬂights for airline i, respectively. Equilibrium prices depend on the qualities
and marginal costs of all the airlines and products that are active in the same route.
For an airline with a hub-and-spoke network, the (total) variable proﬁt function TRi ≡
P
r∈L(xi) Rir(x) is supermodular with respect to the airline entry decisions at diﬀerent city-
pairs. Consider an airline with hub at city A and spoke cities B and C. The total variable
proﬁti sTR i(xi,AB,x i,AC)=xi,ABRi,AB+xi,ACRi,AC+xi,ABxi,ACRi,BC. If the airline operates
in city-pair AC, the additional proﬁto fo p e r a t i n gi nc i t y - p a i rAB is not only Ri,AB but
Ri,AB + Ri,BC. Therefore, if Ri,BC > 0, there is complementarity between the decisions of
operating in city-pairs AB and AC. Or more formally, the airline’s variable proﬁtf u n c t i o ni s
supermodular in (xi,AB,x i,AC), i.e., [TR i(1,1)−TR i(0,1)]−[TRi(1,0)−TR i(0,0)] = Ri,BC >
0.






imt,w h e r eγ
FC(0)
i ≥ 0 and γ
FC(1)
i ≥ 0 are parameters. The component
εFC
imt is private information of the airline. This private information shock is assumed to be
independently and identically distributed over ﬁrms and over time with zero mean. HUBimt
represents the hub-size of airline i in the airports of city-pair m as measured by the total
number of cities that airline i connects with nonstop-ﬂights from the origin and destination
airports in city-pair m: HUBimt ≡
P
m0∈Cm xim0t,w h e r eCm is the set of markets with a
common city with market m.T h e p a r a m e t e r γ
FC(0)
i represents airline i’s ﬁx e dc o s ti na
market where it does not have any other connections. The parameter γ
FC(1)
i measures how
airline i’s ﬁxed cost declines with its hub-size in the city-pair. The start-up cost SCimt
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δ
SC(0)
i ≥ 0 and δ
SC(1)





i are strictly positive, proﬁts at diﬀerent city-pairs are interconnected
11A si nt h ec a s eo fv a r i a b l ep r o ﬁts, Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009) consider a richer speciﬁcation of ﬁxed
costs and entry costs that includes both airline and city permanent heterogeneity.
5through the hub-size eﬀects. This is a second source of complementarity between an airline’s
entry decisions at diﬀerent city-pairs.
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). Airlines maximize intertemporal proﬁts. They are
forward-looking and take into account the implications of their entry-exit decisions on fu-
ture proﬁts and on the expected future reaction of competitors. We assume that airlines’
strategies depend only on payoﬀ-relevant state variables, i.e., Markov perfect equilibrium
assumption. An airline’s payoﬀ-relevant information at quarter t is {xt,εit},w h e r eεit is the
vector of airline and market-speciﬁc private information shocks {εFC
imt,ε SC
imt : m =1 ,2,...,M}.
Let σ ≡ {σi(xt,εit):i =1 ,2,...,N} be a set of strategy functions, one for each airline, such
that σi is a function from X×R2M into {0,1}M.AM P Ei nt h i sg a m ei sas e to fs t r a t e g y
functions such that each airline’s strategy maximizes its value for each possible state (xt,εit)
and taking as given other airlines’ strategies.
Let V σ
i (xt,εit) represent the value function for airline i given that the other airlines
behave according to their respective strategies in σ, and given that airline i uses his best
response/strategy. By the principle of optimality, this value function is implicitly deﬁned as
the unique solution to the following Bellman equation:
V
σ
i (xt,εit)=m a x
xit+1
{ Πi(xt,xit+1) − εit(xit+1)+βE[V
σ
i (xt+1,εit+1) | xt,xit+1] } (2)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor; Πi(xt,xit+1) represents the common-knowledge
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{ Πi(xt,xit+1) − εit(xit+1)+βE[V
σ
i (xt+1,εit+1) | xt,xit+1] } (3)
That is, every airline is in its best response to the other airlines’ strategies. An equilibrium
in this dynamic game provides a description of the joint dynamics of prices, quantities, and
airlines’ incumbent status for every route between the C cities of the industry.
6For the computation of an equilibrium, and for the structural estimation of the model, it
is convenient to deﬁne a MPE in terms of airlines’ conditional choice probabilities (CCPs).
Deﬁne the choice probability Pi(xit+1|xt) ≡
R
1{σi(xt,εit)=xit+1}dGε(εit),w h e r e1{.} is
the indicator function, and Gε is the CDF of εit. Pi(xit+1|xt) is the probability that airline
i operates a network xit+1 at period t +1given that the industry network at period t is
xt.L e tP be the vector of CCPs associated with σ, i.e., P = {Pi(xit+1|xt):i =1 ,2,...,N;
xit+1 ∈ {0,1}M; xt ∈ X}. Following Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), a MPE in this dynamic
game can be described as a vector of probabilities P that solves the ﬁxed point problem
P = Ψ(P),w h e r eΨ(P) is a vector-valued best-response probability function.


















i }. Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009) show that these parameters are identiﬁed
using data on prices and quantities at the airline-route level (for the identiﬁcation of de-
mand and variable cost parameters), and on the transition of airlines’ networks (for the
identiﬁcation of ﬁxed costs and entry costs).
Entry Deterrence and Hub-and-Spoke Networks. Given consistent estimates of the vector of
structural parameters θ, and of the equilibrium in the data, as represented by the vector of
choice probabilities P, we are interested in measuring the role of hub-and-spoke networks as
a credible strategy to deter entry of point-to-point carriers. This entry deterrence argument
is based on the supermodularity (complementarity) of the total variable proﬁtf u n c t i o no f
a hub-and-spoke airline. The elimination of this supermodularity should also remove this
potential source of entry deterrence. More speciﬁcally, if this supermodularity generates
entry deterrence, then by eliminating it for a certain airline we should ﬁnd that the airline
has both a lower propensity to ’hubbing’ (i.e., lower concentration of its operation in a few
cities as measured by concentration ratios CR1 or CR2), and a lower number of city-pairs
w h e r ei to p e r a t e sa sam o n o p o l i s t .
To implement this type of comparative statics exercise, we need to deﬁne a counterfactual
scenario where we eliminate this source supermodularity in the variable proﬁt of a hub-and-
spoke airline. We consider the following approach. Suppose that we describe an airline as
7a group of local managers, one for each city-pair m. The double index (i,m) represents
the local manager of airline i in market m. This local manager decides whether to operate
non-stop ﬂights in city-pair m. In our model, the decision making of an airline is central-
ized. Therefore, the model assumes that all the local managers of an airline internalize the
complementarities between their entry-exit decisions.12 To eliminate supermodularity in an
airline variable proﬁts we consider the counterfactual scenario where the local managers of
an airline are concerned with the maximization of its own city-pair proﬁt that includes only
t h ev a r i a b l ep r o ﬁtf r o mn o n - s t o pﬂights between the two cities. This counterfactual local
manager ignores that his city-pair is a segment of many other routes and that the operation
of his city-pair can generate additional proﬁts in these other routes. For instance, consider
the example of the hub-and-spoke airline with hub at city A and spokes at cities B and C.
The total variable proﬁt of the airline is TR(xAB,x AC)=xABRAB+xACRAC +xABxACRBC,
that is a supermodular function when RBC > 0. However, in the counterfactual scenario, the
local manager in city pair AB is only concerned with its local variable proﬁt xABRAB (and
the local manager AC is only concerned with proﬁt xACRAC). Therefore, these “uncoordi-
nated” local managers do not take into account the complementarity of their decisions in the
total proﬁt of the airline. In an equilibrium of this counterfactual model, we expect that the
network of the airline presents a lower degree of ’hubbing’. Furthermore, if the entry deter-
rence motive is signiﬁcant in the factual equilibrium, we expect that in the counterfactual
the airline will be a monopolist in a smaller number of markets.
3 Empirical evidence
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009) estimate the dynamic game that we have described above
using data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) for the 55 largest cities
in US. Here we summarize the main empirical results in that paper, with particular attention
to those results related to strategic entry deterrence.
12The estimated model in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2009) considers a certain degree of decentralization
in local managers decision making. However, in that model, local managers still internalize the complemen-
tarities in their operation decisions.
8Economies of scope in ﬁx e dc o s t sa n ds t a r t - u pc o s t s . Estimated ﬁx e dc o s t sa n ds t a r t - u p
costs at the city-pair level are sizeable. The mean value (averaged over airlines and markets)
of ﬁxed costs is $119,000 or 75% of city-pair quarterly variable proﬁt. Start-up costs are
on average equal to $298,000, that accounts for 187% of city-pair quarterly variable proﬁt.
Although we ﬁnd very important airline heterogeneity in estimated ﬁxed and start-up costs,
the average airline has signiﬁcant incentives to save these costs by reducing the number of
non-stop connections using a hub-and-spoke network. These incentives are even larger when
we take into account economies of scope at the airport level. The estimated values of the
parameters that measure these economies of scope are γFC(1) =$ 1 ,020 and δ
SC(1) =$ 9 ,260.
That is, one additional non-stop connection (i.e., a unit increase in hub-size HUBimt)r e d u c e s
city-pair ﬁxed costs in $1,020 a n ds t a r t - u pc o s t si n$9,260. Counterfactual experiments
show that these economies of scope in ﬁxed costs and, particularly, in start-up costs play an
important role to explain the propensity of legacy carriers to use hub-and-spoke networks.
Strategic entry deterrence. To measure the entry deterrence motive of hub-and-spoke net-
works, we implement the counterfactual experiment described at the end of previous sec-
tion.13 Table 2 presents a summary of the counterfactual experiments. Each row represents
ad i ﬀerent experiment, i.e., a experiment where we eliminate supermodularity in the variable
proﬁt of a single airline, leaving the other airlines unchanged, and calculate a new equilibrium
of the dynamic game.
For all the legacy airlines (i.e., all the airlines in Table 2 except Southwest), eliminating
supermodularity in variable proﬁts implies a signiﬁcant reduction in the concentration ratio
CR2 that measures the degree of ’hubbing’. Interestingly, there is also an important reduc-
tion in the number of city-pairs where the airline operates as a monopolist.14 The reduction
in CR2 and in the number of monopoly markets is particularly important for Northwest and
Delta. It seems that the entry deterrence motive of using a hub-and-spoke network plays an
13To deal with the problem of multiple equilibria under the counterfactual scenario, we implement the
method in Aguirregabiria (2009).
14We should clarify our use of the term monopolist in Table 2. What we mean is that the airline is the
only carrier that operates non-stop ﬂights in the city-pair. Of course, this does not mean that the airline
is really a monopolist in the routes between the two cities because there may be other airlines that operate
stop ﬂights that connect the two cities. Nevertheless, given that consumers prefer non-stop ﬂights to stop
ﬂights, it is clear that being the only carrier operating non-stop ﬂi g h t sp r o v i d e ss i g n i ﬁcant market power.
9important role for these airlines. Northwest and Delta are the airlines that, after Southwest,
operate as monopolists in a larger number of city-pairs and that have largest hub sizes. Also,
these airlines tend to operate as monopolies in city-pairs with relatively small market size.
According to our estimates, the large number of monopoly markets enjoyed by these carriers









i . Instead, it is mainly explained by lower values of the endogenous
part of the costs, i.e., −γ
FC(1)
i HUBim and −δ
SC(1)
i HUBim.
In a certain sense, Southwest represents the opposite case to Northwest and Delta. South-
west is, by far, the airline with the smallest contribution of the entry deterrence motive.
According to the estimated model, Southwest enjoys a large number of monopoly markets







i ,a n dδ
SC(0)
i ). This cost eﬃciency allows the airline to operate in small mar-
kets. Other interesting result of our experiments is that in the counterfactual equilibrium,
Southwest tends to enter in a large proportion of the markets that Northwest and Delta leave
when we eliminate supermodularity in their proﬁt functions. Again, this result is consistent
with an entry deterrence use of their hub-and-spoke networks by Northwest and Delta.
Nevertheless, the net welfare eﬀect of this type of entry deterrence behavior is ambiguous.
On the one hand, this strategy is restricting the entry of carriers that have ex-ante lower
operating costs, such as Southwest Airlines. On the other hand, the estimated model shows
that hub-and-spoke networks exploit economies of scope and density that generate ex-post
very signiﬁcant cost reductions. Southwest low-cost strategy has shown to be an eﬀective
way to compete with large hub-and-spoke carriers. However, the estimated model shows that
this does not mean that the Pareto optimal structure of the industry should be one with
many “Southwest-like” point-to-point carriers. This industry structure would not exploit
very signiﬁcant cost savings associated with hub-and-spoke networks. In this context, it is
of great interest the consideration and evaluation of policies that try to reduce the entry
deterrence eﬀect of hub-and-spoke networks but that can maintain most of the cost savings
associated with these networks.
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11Table 1
Measures of ’Hubbing’ in the US Airline Industry: Year 2004
Airline (Code) 1st largest hub Concentration 2nd largest hub Concentration
(# connections) Ratio CR1 (# connections) Ratio CR2
Southwest (WN) Las Vegas (35) 9.3 Phoenix (33) 18.2
American (AA) Dallas (52) 22.3 Chicago (46) 42.0
United (UA) Chicago (50) 25.1 Denver (41) 45.7
Delta (DL) Atlanta (53) 26.7 Cincinnati (42) 48.0
Continental (CO) Houston (52) 36.6 New York (45) 68.3
Northwest (NW) Minneapolis (47) 25.6 Detroit (43) 49.2
US Airways (US) Charlotte (35) 23.3 Philadelphia (33) 45.3
America West (HP) Phoenix (40) 35.4 Las Vegas (28) 60.2
Alaska (AS) Seattle (18) 56.2 Portland (10) 87.5
ATA (TZ) Chicago (16) 48.4 Indianapolis (6) 66.6
JetBlue (B6) New York (13) 59.0 Long Beach (4) 77.3
Frontier (F9) Denver (27) 56.2 Los Angeles (5) 66.6
AirTran (FL) Atlanta (24) 68.5 Dallas (4) 80.0
Trans States (AX) St Louis (18) 62.0 Pittsburgh (7) 93.9
Reno Air (QX) Portland (8) 53.3 Denver (7) 100.0
Sun Country (SY) Minneapolis (11) 100.0 (0) 100.0
Source: DB1B Database form the US Bureau of Transportation. Year 2004.
Table 2
Entry Deterrence Motive of Hub-and-Spoke Networks
Observed Counterfactual Observed Counterfactual
Concentration Ratio Concentration Ratio #o fC i t y - P a i r sw h e r e # of City-Pairs where
Carrier CR2 CR2 Airline is a Monopolist Airline is a Monopolist
Southwest 18.2 16.5 151 149 (-1%)
American 42.0 24.5 31 26 (-16%)
United 45.7 30.3 16 12 (-25%)
Delta 48.0 22.1 57 21 (-63%)
Continental 68.3 42.8 27 20 (-26%)
Northwest 49.2 23.2 66 25 (-62%)
US Airways 45.3 35.2 8 6( - 2 5 % )
Based on estimation results in Aguirregabiria and Ho (2009)
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